Sovereign risk in international bond markets and nonconvergence by Böhm, Volker & Vachadze, George
Sovereign Risk in International Bond Markets
and Nonconvergence
Volker Bo¨hm and George Vachadze
December 2008
Discussion Paper No. 576
Department of Economics
Bielefeld University
P.O.Box 10 01 31
D-33501 Bielefeld
Germany
Sovereign Risk in International Bond Markets
and Nonconvergence∗
Volker Bo¨hm and George Vachadze
Department of Economics
Bielefeld University
P.O.Box 10 01 31
D-33501 Bielefeld
Germany
Discussion Paper No. 576
December 2008
Abstract
The paper analyzes the consequences of joining markets of government discount
bonds between identical economies when, in each country, there exists a positive
probability of the government to default. In autarky such economies of overlapping
generations of consumers with capital accumulation converge to a unique positive
steady state under certain conditions. When two identical economies of this type
open their markets for bonds to the consumers of the other country, diversification
in portfolio demand by consumers leads to the existence of a world equilibrium
with a uniform bond price in every period. Under such circumstances a symmetric
stationary world equilibrium with lower risk per country exists, supported by the
same level of capital and income as under autarky. However, due to the interaction
of dynamic spill over effects between the bond market and the domestic markets
for capital investment, the symmetric steady state may become unstable and sta-
ble asymmetric steady states appear, implying symmetry breaking in the sense of
Matsuyama (2004). The paper identifies a set of assumptions on consumer and
production characteristics together with a range of values of the government’s de-
fault parameters, such that instability occurs and asymmetric steady states become
locally stable.
Keywords: capital accumulation, sovereign risk, international bond markets, non
convergence, symmetry-breaking.
JEL classification: C62, D91, E20, E44, F36, F41, F43, G11, G12, G15, O11, O41
∗This paper was written as part of the project “International Financial Markets and Economic Devel-
opment of Nations” supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under contract BO 635/12-2.
1
1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction
The debate on the consequences of a liberalization of asset markets internationally has
been carried out primarily under the premise that more trading options for investors
between countries also increase real investment opportunities in each country, supporting
or reinforcing an innate tendency to equalize incomes across countries. Therefore, many
economists regard an asset market liberalization between countries not only as a device for
additional risk sharing between countries, but also as an essential vehicle for convergence
of per capita incomes across countries.
According to traditional views, liberalized asset markets facilitate the flow of financial re-
sources from industrialized countries with abundant capital to developing countries where
capital is scarce. It is usually argued that this flow reduces the cost of capital and in-
creases capital investment in developing countries. In other words, if the flow of funds
leads to more capital formation in the less developed country, the latter will grow faster
inducing convergence of incomes, as argued for example by Fischer (1998) and Summers
(2000). Some economists have expressed skepticism that such consequences are universal
arguing that the liberalization of financial markets might promote a flow of funds from
capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries as well. If present, these would affect the
capital investment in poor countries adversely and could cause a serious impediment to
income growth, inducing divergence rather than convergence of incomes across countries
under liberalized asset markets. In such cases, a liberalization at times of uneven distri-
butions of capital and income across countries might result in stationary states dividing
the world into poor and rich countries permanently, when standard allocative economic
arguments would predict a symmetric outcome. Matsuyama (2004, 2005) has introduced
the term symmetry breaking for such a situation.
The recent literature identifies different structures in economic models why capital ac-
count liberalization may promote a flow of financial capital from capital-scarce to capital-
abundant countries causing symmetry breaking. Imperfections in the credit market can
be one such reason, leading to a reverse flow of capital from capital-scarce to capital-
abundant countries as a result of capital account liberalization, as shown for example by
Boyd & Smith (1997), Matsuyama (2004), and Kikuchi & Stachurski (2009). Another
cause may be consequences of agglomeration in each country as an outcome of increasing
returns to scale (see Krugman & Venables (1995) and Matsuyama (1996)). In such a
case, the domestic rate of return on capital increases as more capital is allocated to that
country. As a result, structurally identical economies can find themselves in quite dis-
similar situations after liberalization of capital accounts, because higher returns not only
attract more capital, but also more capital implies higher returns, due to agglomeration.
In both cases the effects are caused by specific non convexities existing in each economy
in an otherwise fully convex competitive world. Thus, both explanations support in prin-
ciple the traditional view that more liberalization induces a beneficial effect to developing
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countries and induces further convergence if these non convexities were not present. A
third cause has been shown when there is uncertainty of the return of a private financial
asset (shares or equity) arising from random dividends in production (see Bo¨hm, Kikuchi
& Vachadze (2007), Kikuchi (2008), and Bo¨hm & Vachadze (2009)).
In all three cases, the free flow of financial resources after liberalization can cause even
small existing differences across countries to magnify. As a result, the world economy
may inevitably become divided endogenously into rich and poor countries. Financial
capital will flow from poor to rich countries, despite the fact that the return on real
capital is higher in developing countries. Rich countries are characterized by high income,
high investment, and low credit market imperfection or low agglomeration, while poor
countries suffer from low income, low investment, and high credit market imperfections
or high agglomeration .
The present paper identifies the possibility of default of two separate but identical gov-
ernments issuing bonds as a structural reason for symmetry breaking. From the consumer
point of view, bonds are treated like any other asset in the portfolio decision problem,
serving as an additional but risky investment opportunity to real capital. This makes
the portfolio problem of consumers similar to the private asset case, but the dynamic
structure under perfect foresight with private assets is structurally different and more
involved than with bonds, since the former requires the solution of a functional equation.
Moreover, the impact of the risk of default on the dynamics of capital accumulation is
quite different from the three cases studied before. Under autarky such economies of
overlapping generations of consumers, with a government and a bond market converge to
a unique positive steady state when relative risk aversion is increasing and concave and
when substitutability in production is sufficiently high. When the bond markets of two
economies are liberalized internationally, symmetry breaking may occur, i. e. the symmet-
ric steady state of the world economy with perfect risk diversification becomes unstable
and asymmetric stable steady states emerge after consumers from both countries trade
government bonds internationally.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model in Section 2, Section
3 analyzes each economy in autarky and shows the existence and global stability of a
unique and interior steady state. Section 4 analyzes a world economy composed of two
identical economies and shows that symmetry breaking occurs provided a general elasticity
condition holds at the symmetric steady state. Thus, the endogenous formation of rich and
poor countries can be an inevitable outcome of internationalizing bond markets. Section
5 summarizes the results and concludes.
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Consider a world economy with an infinite-horizon in discrete time. Each economy is
composed of a government, a consumption and a production sector. The production sector
consist of a large number of infinitely lived firms producing a single final commodity. The
technology of each firm has constant returns to scale, is identical and constant through
time. At any time t, a standard production function F : R2+ → R determines total
output as Yt = F (Kt, Lt), where Kt ≥ 0 and Lt ≥ 0 are aggregate supplies of physical
capital and labor respectively. Let kt = Kt/Lt denote capital per worker and let f :
R+ → R+ denote the production function in intensity form. Hence, output per worker is
yt = Yt/Lt = F (Kt/Lt, 1) ≡ f(kt). f is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing, strictly concave, satisfying the Inada conditions. In addition, f(0) = 0
holds, implying that capital is essential in production.
Both factor markets are competitive so that factor rewards on physical capital and labor
are equal to their respective marginal products. Thus, rt = r(kt) ≡ f
′(kt) is the rental
rate of capital and wt = w(kt) ≡ f(kt) − ktf
′(kt) is the wage rate in a given period.
The produced commodity can be either consumed or invested in physical capital, which
becomes available in the next period. Capital depreciates fully within a period.
The sovereign governments in each country face a stream of public expenditures, which
is exogenous, stochastic, and unproductive. These expenditures are financed by levying
a proportional tax on labor income at the rate 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and by issuing one-period pure
discount bonds in the amount of b > 0 with default option. One discount bond pays
one unit of consumption in the subsequent period if the government does not default its
obligation. It pays δ ∈ [0, 1) units of goods otherwise. The parameter δ measures the
debt recovery rate, which is the fraction of debt repaid if the sovereign defaults on his
obligation. The governments’ no-default/default situations are exogenous and random
and occurs independently with probabilities p ∈ (0, 1) and 1− p respectively.
The consumption sector of the economy is described by two period lived consumers. There
are two generations alive in each period, called young and old, where each generation con-
sists of a large number of homogeneous agents. There is no population growth. A typical
young agent is endowed with one unit of labor, which he supplies inelastically to the
labor market where he earns the wage income wt. There is no consumption in the first
period. After paying the wage tax, a young consumer chooses a portfolio consisting of
real savings/investment (which becomes real capital in the next period) and portfolio of
bonds. Consumers are risk averse and their preferences over the second period consump-
tion is described by a utility function u : R+ → R, which is three times continuously
differentiable, non-negative, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
We consider two cases separately. First we consider the case when the bond markets op-
erate only domestically and young consumers purchase only their own country’s discount
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bonds. In the second case the bond markets operate internationally and consumers in the
two countries can buy bonds of both countries in an international bond market. In other
words, consumers of each country can invest in domestic capital and can purchase bonds
of both countries.
3 The Closed Economy
Consider first the case of autarky with a domestic bond market only. A young agent’s
budget constraint is it + xtqt ≤ (1 − τ)wt, where it denotes the amount of physical
capital investment and xt is the number of discount bonds purchased at a price qt. Young
consumers cannot take a short position in either of the two asset markets, i. e. they can
neither obtain credit to finance their demand for bonds nor are they allowed to sell bonds
in order to finance their capital investment. Therefore, it ≥ 0 and xt ≥ 0 for any t.
Suppose xt ≥ 0 bonds are purchased and rt+1 is next period’s rental rate of capital. Then
second period consumption
ct+1 =


(1− τ)wtrt+1 + xt(δ − qtrt+1) with prob 1− p
(1− τ)wtrt+1 + xt(1− qtrt+1) with prob p
is random which can be written as
ct+1 = ((1− τ)wt − qtxt) rt+1 + xt (1− (1− δ)dt+1) , (1)
where dt+1 ∈ {0, 1} denotes the government’s default indicator taking the values zero
(case of no-default) with probability p and one (case of default) with probability 1 − p.
Observe that the first term in (1) is equal to the expected return itrt+1 on real investment.
Therefore, given the law of capital accumulation kt+1 = it = (1−τ)wt−qtxt, under perfect
foresight one may write itrt+1 = ρ(kt+1) = kt+1f
′(kt+1) where ρ(k) := kf
′(k) denotes
capital income. Therefore, under perfect foresight, one may define
ct+1 := ρ(kt+1) + xt and ct+1 := ρ(kt+1) + δxt. (2)
A young agent’s objective is to maximize expected utility of second period consumption
max
xt∈B(qt,wt)
pu(ct+1) + (1− p)u(ct+1), (3)
where B(qt, wt) = {xt|xt ≥ 0, qtxt ≤ (1− τ)wt} is the current budget set and ct+1 and ct+1
are the consumption levels in cases of the no-default and the default case respectively.
The first order condition for an interior solution is
pu′(ct+1) (1− qtrt+1) + (1− p)u
′(ct+1) (δ − qtrt+1) = 0. (4)
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Under perfect foresight and using the law of capital accumulation as described above,
equation (4) implies the following inverse demand function for the bond
qt = H(kt+1, xt) :=
h(kt+1, xt)
r(kt+1)
, (5)
where
h(kt+1, xt) ≡
pu′(ρ(kt+1) + xt) + (1− p)δu
′(ρ(kt+1) + δxt)
pu′(ρ(kt+1) + xt) + (1− p)u′(ρ(kt+1) + δxt)
∈ (0, 1) (6)
is the risk adjusted second period payment on the bond. Observe that the inverse demand
function does not contain the wage income wt as an argument any more, as one would
expect from such an analysis. This is due to the fact that wt appears linearly in the
law of capital accumulation (no consumption when young!) and a consequence of perfect
foresight. Together these conditions imply that the role of the current net wage cancels
out in the inverse demand for bonds.
The results of the paper are driven primarily by properties of the production function and
of the utility function, which restrict the curvature of these two concave functions. The
first one imposes a lower bound on the elasticity of substitution in production between
capital and labor, which is tantamount to a condition on the monotonicity of the capital
return. The second one restricts the absolute risk aversion of the consumer to be non
increasing with an elasticity between minus one and zero.
Assumption 1 The production function f is such that capital income ρ(k) := kf ′(k) is
a strictly increasing function.
In other words, with differentiability and strict concavity of f , the elasticity of f ′ must
be greater than minus one, ǫf ′(k) ∈ (−1, 0), for every k. Equivalently, this implies also
that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σ : R+ → R+ and the capital
share in production α : R+ → [0, 1], defined as
σ(k) := −
f ′(k) (f(k)− kf ′(k))
kf ′′(k)f(k)
and α(k) :=
kf ′(k)
f(k)
, (7)
satisfy the inequality σ(k) ≥ 1− α(k) for any k ∈ R+, since
σ(k) = −
1− α(k)
ǫf ′(k)
where ǫf ′(k) :=
kf ′′(k)
f ′(k)
> −1.
Let R(c) := −
u′′(c)
u′(c)
denote the degree of absolute risk aversion associated with the utility
of the consumer and let
ǫR(c) :=
cR′(c)
R(c)
be the elasticity of absolute risk aversion.
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Assumption 2 The utility function u of the consumer is such that the elasticity of ab-
solute risk aversion is between zero and minus one, i. e. −1 ≤ ǫR(c) ≤ 0 for any c ≥ 0.
Observe that this assumption stipulates that the degree of absolute risk aversion is a non
increasing function with elasticity no less than minus one. In other words, R(c) declines
less sharply than 1/c. Since the degree of relative risk aversion is defined as cR(c) the
restriction on the elasticity of absolute risk aversion imposes simultaneously that relative
risk aversion is non decreasing, since
d
dc
(cR(c)) = R(c)
(
1 + ǫR(c)
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ −1 ≤ ǫR(c).
This assumption covers a large class of utility functions, which includes the exponential
family u′(c) = exp
(
−a c
1−γ
1−γ
)
, containing in particular the isoelastic functions u(c) =
(1/(1− a)) c1−a, a < 1, as a special case. Moreover, the assumption on the elasticity
implies that the absolute risk aversion satisfies R(y+x)−δR(y+δx) > 0, for any x, y > 0
and δ ∈ [0, 1), a useful property needed in the proof of the following proposition1.
Proposition 1 If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then the inverse demand function
(k, x) 7→ H(k, x) defined in equation (5) is monotonically increasing with respect to its
first argument and monotonically decreasing with respect to its second argument2.
The above property of the inverse demand function will play an important role in estab-
lishing properties of the equilibrium map of capital accumulation under perfect foresight.
Market clearing in any period t, with total bond supply b > 0 and perfect foresight,
implies that next period’s capital stock must satisfy the equation
kt+1 = (1− τ)w(kt)−H(kt+1, b)b. (8)
Let us first show that (8) yields a unique solution for the level of capital accumulation
kt+1 for each kt ≥ 0 in some compact interval. Let K > 0 denote the unique solution of
the equation k = (1− τ)w(k)3. Then, for any kt ∈ [0, K], equation (8) implies that
kt+1 = (1− τ)w(kt)−H(kt+1, b)b ≤ (1− τ)w(kt) ≤ (1− τ)w(K) = K. (9)
Therefore, for any k0 < K ⇒ kt < K for all t > 0. Thus, the interval [0, K] is a forward
invariant set of the difference equation (8). Define the function ∆ : [0, K]× [0, K]→ R+
as follows
(kt+1, kt) 7→ ∆(kt+1, kt) := kt+1 +H(kt+1, b)b− (1− τ)w(kt). (10)
1see Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
2see appendix for the proof
3Existence and uniqueness follow from Assumptions 1 and 3 which imply that w(k)/k is strictly
decreasing. See also Azariadis & Drazen (1990), pp. 511–512.
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It follows from Proposition 1 that ∆ is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to
its first argument for a given kt ∈ (0, K]. In addition, ∆(0, kt) = −(1− τ)w(kt) < 0 and
∆(K, kt) = K + H(K, b)b − (1 − τ)w(kt) ≥ H(K, b)b > 0. Applying the Intermediate
Value theorem implies the existence and uniqueness of kt+1 ∈ [0, K] solving the equation
∆(kt, kt+1) = 0. Let kt+1 = G(kt) denote the solution.
Definition 1 A steady state of the closed economy is a stationary level of capital k∗
satisfying k∗ = G(k∗).
It is clear from equation (10), that kt+1 = 0 solves the equation ∆(kt+1, 0) = 0 implying
that k∗ = 0 is a corner steady state. To guarantee that there exists a unique globally
attracting positive steady state one further assumption is needed.
Assumption 3 For any k ∈ R+, the elasticity α(k) of the production function f is less
than 0.5, i. e. α(k) < 0.5.
Proposition 2 If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied, then there exists a unique inte-
rior steady state in the closed economy which is globally stable.
Proof: Define φ : [0, K]→ R+ as
φ(k) := [(1− τ)w(k)− k] r(k) (11)
Then, equations (5), (6), and (8) yield that a steady state k must satisfy the equation
φ(k) = h(k, b)b. Assumption 3 implies that (i) φ(k) is strictly decreasing and non-negative
for k ∈ [0, K], and (ii) φ(0) = ∞, and φ(K) = 0. Assumptions 1 and 2 yield that the
function h(k, b)b is strictly increasing and non-negative for k ∈ [0, K]. Therefore, existence
and uniqueness of an interior steady state follows.
To prove global stability, consider the time one mapG : [0, K]→ [0, K]. Since the function
(kt+1, kt) 7→ ∆(kt+1, kt) is increasing with respect to its first argument and decreasing with
respect to its second argument, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that G(kt)
is strictly increasing. Moreover, G(0) = 0 and G(K) < K. Together with the uniqueness
of the interior steady state, this implies that all orbits must be monotonic sequences
converging to the interior steady state. Therefore, the steady state is globally stable. 
The role of Assumption 3 is essential in proving existence and uniqueness of an interior
steady state. It guarantees that the function φ(k) is monotonic. It is easy to construct
examples where φ(k) is not monotonic when Assumption 3 is violated. In such cases,
there may exist multiple steady states or the economy may have the corner steady state
only. Under multiplicity this implies the existence of unstable interior steady states and
the occurrence of a poverty trap. While there seems to be no particular theoretical
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justification to restrict the elasticity of production to less than one half, as is done in
Assumption 3, its impact on the dynamic characteristics of a closed economy with a
bond market is striking. For the comparative analysis of the role of a bond market in
open economies and in a world economy, to be carried out below, Assumption 3 will
be assumed throughout. Therefore, the causes of multiplicity and instability in open
economies cannot be attributed to a non convexity of the wage function, identifying the
mechanisms associated with bond market integration as the main source of the diverging
results.
4 A Two Country World Economy
Next consider a world economy composed of two identical economies of the above type,
denoted h (for home country) and f (for foreign country). As before it is assumed that
factors of production are immobile across countries, but now, the two bond markets are
opened up internationally. In each country, the government issues the same number
of bonds b each period while the occurrence of default and the default recovery ratio
remains the same. Thus, the return on the two bonds are two random variables which
are independent and identically distributed.
With two bonds now available for investment internationally, the consumer in each country
has three investment opportunities. Since the two bonds are stochastically the same
random variable, the price of the bonds must be the same in equilibrium. In this case,
due to risk aversion, consumers will diversify their portfolio of bonds completely, holding
always equal amounts of each bond. Thus, under bond market clearing at a uniform price,
any feasible bond holding can be defined by a pair (x, 2b− x) where 0 ≤ x ≤ 2b denotes
the number of bonds of a country held by its consumers.
Now, let X jt = (x
j
t/2, x
j
t/2) denote the portfolio a young consumer of country j = h, f
purchases at time t, containing 50% of the bonds issued by the home government and 50%
are bonds issued by the foreign government. Purchasing a portfolio X jt = (x
j
t/2, x
j
t/2), a
young consumer faces the budget constraint it + xtqt ≤ (1− τ)wt. This, in turn, implies
a second period random consumption
ct+1 =


(1− τ)wtrt+1 + xt(1− qtrt+1) with probability p
2
(1− τ)wtrt+1 + xt
(
1 + δ
2
− qtrt+1
)
with probability 2p(1− p)
(1− τ)wtrt+1 + xt(δ − qtrt+1) with probability (1− p)
2.
(12)
This can also be expressed as
ct+1 = ((1− τ)wt − xtqt) rt+1 + xt
(
1−
1− δ
2
(dht+1 + d
f
t+1)
)
, (13)
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where djt+1 ∈ {0, 1} denotes government j’s default indicator. Again, taking into consid-
eration the law of capital accumulation in each country kt+1 = (1 − τ)w(kt) − xtqt, one
obtains that the random second period consumption can be written as
ct+1 = ρ(kt+1) + xt, ct+1 = ρ(kt+1) +
1 + δ
2
xt, and ct+1 = ρ(kt+1) + δxt,
(14)
where ct+1, ct+1 and ct+1 are second period consumptions, when neither of the govern-
ments defaults on its obligation, one of the governments default, and both governments
default on their obligations respectively. Using this notation, one can write the consumer’s
optimization problem as
max
xt≥0
{
p2u(ct+1) + 2p(1− p)u(ct+1) + (1− p)
2u(c
t+1
) | qtxt ≤ (1− τ)wt
}
, (15)
and one obtains as the first order condition for an interior solution
p2u′(ct+1) (1− qtrt+1)+2p(1−p)u
′(ct+1)
(
1 + δ
2
− qtrt+1
)
+(1−p)2u′(c
t+1
) (δ − qtrt+1) = 0.
(16)
This implies again an explicit inverse demand function for bonds
qt = Π(kt+1, xt) :=
π(kt+1, xt)
r(kt+1)
, (17)
where
π(kt+1, xt) :=
p2u′(ct+1) + p(1− p)(1 + δ)u
′(ct+1) + (1− p)
2δu′(c
t+1
)
p2u′(ct+1) + 2p(1− p)u′(ct+1) + (1− p)
2u′(c
t+1
)
, (18)
is the risk adjusted second period payment of the portfolio Xt = (xt/2, xt/2).
Proposition 3 If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then the inverse demand function
(k, x) 7→ Π(k, x) defined in equations (17) and (18) is monotonically increasing with
respect to its first argument and monotonically decreasing with respect to its second argu-
ment4.
The properties of the inverse demand function can be used to define the direct portfolio
demand function. Suppose the pair (kht+1, k
f
t+1) is such that the following inequalities are
satisfied Π(kht+1, 0) > Π(k
f
t+1, 2b) and Π(k
h
t+1, 2b) < Π(k
f
t+1, 0). Then, the monotonicity
property of the function Π implies that the equation
Π(kht+1, x) = Π(k
f
t+1, 2b− x). (19)
has a unique solution with respect to x. Let X(kht+1, k
f
t+1) denote this solution. We
set X(kht+1, k
f
t+1) = 0 when Π(k
h
t+1, 0) ≤ Π(k
f
t+1, 2b) and set X(k
h
t+1, k
f
t+1) = 2b when
4The proof of this proposition is similar to the one of Proposition 1.
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Π(kht+1, 2b) ≥ Π(k
f
t+1, 0). The function X : [0, K]× [0, K]→ [0, 2b] denotes the demand of
an equally weighted portfolio chosen by a consumer of the home country. By definition, the
following identity X(kht+1, k
f
t+1) +X(k
f
t+1, k
h
t+1) ≡ 2b is satisfied for any pair (k
h
t+1, k
f
t+1) ∈
[0, K]× [0, K].
The direct portfolio demand function can now be used to define the dynamics under
perfect foresight. For a given pair (kht , k
f
t )), next period’s capital stock in the home and
in the foreign country (kht+1, k
f
t+1) should satisfy the system of equations

kht+1 = (1− τ)w(k
h
t )−X(k
h
t+1, k
f
t+1)Π
(
kht+1, X(k
h
t+1, k
f
t+1)
)
kft+1 = (1− τ)w(k
f
t )−X(k
f
t+1, k
h
t+1)Π
(
kft+1, X(k
f
t+1, k
h
t+1)
)
.
(20)
Let kht+1 = Φ(k
h
t , k
f
t ) and k
f
t+1 = Φ(k
f
t , k
h
t ) denote the solution of the above system.
Observe that the two equations are perfectly symmetric to each other, namely they are
obtained by a simple permutation of the respective arguments for the inverse demand
function Π and for the direct demand function X, implying that the dynamical system is
symmetric.
Definition 2 A steady state in the world economy is a stationary pair of capital (kh, kf )
such that kh = Φ(kh, kf ) and kf = Φ(kf , kh).
Since the world economy is closed as a whole, it follows from the analysis of a closed
economy that there are two symmetric steady states in the world economy (0, 0) and
(k⋆, k⋆) where k⋆ solves the equation
[(1− τ)w(k)− k] r(k) = π (k, x) x. (21)
with x = b. In both steady states agents of both countries hold a portfolios X = (b/2, b/2)
containing a total of b units of bonds.
The implicit form (20) of the dynamical system (Φ,Φ) shows, that the local stability
of the symmetric steady state (k⋆, k⋆) will depend in a complex manner on the partial
derivatives of the indirect and the direct demand functions Π and X. These describe the
two sided symmetric spill over effects which are at the center of the interaction between
the two economies when their consumers participate jointly in the two fully symmetric
markets. These spill over effects drive the symmetry breaking result below. They are
responsible for the destabilizing forces which occur when two autarkic economies combine
their bond markets.
In view of the next proposition, it is useful to introduce the following notation. Let
ǫk(k, x) =
kΠk(k, x)
Π(k, x)
and ǫx(k, x) =
xΠx(k, x)
Π(k, x)
(22)
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denote the elasticities of the inverse demand function with respect to next period’s capital
and to bond holdings and define their values at the steady state as
ǫ⋆k = ǫk(k
⋆, b) and ǫ⋆x = ǫx(k
⋆, b). (23)
Similarly, let q⋆ = Π(k⋆, b) denote the bond price at the symmetric steady state, α⋆ the
capital share in production, and σ⋆ the elasticity of substitution.
Now, define a critical value µ⋆ as
µ⋆ := ǫ⋆k + ǫ
⋆
x
(
1 +
1
s⋆
(
α⋆
σ⋆
− 1
))
, (24)
where
s⋆ =
bq⋆
(1− τ)w(k⋆)
and 1− s⋆ =
k⋆
(1− τ)w(k⋆)
(25)
denote the proportion of net wage income spent on the bond market and on physical
capital investment respectively.
It is clear that, after combining the two bond markets, there are two asymmetric steady
states, in which one country buys all bonds and holds a positive level of capital and
the other deteriorates to zero level capital and income. Thus, (0, k˜) and (k˜, 0) are two
asymmetric steady states, where k˜ solves the equation (21) with x = 2b. In order to answer
whether there exist asymmetric and interior steady states in which both countries hold
a positive capital stock, we introduce the following notation. Let k = ξ(x) denotes the
unique solution of equation (21) with respect to k for any given x ∈ [0, 2b]. Let the
function Λ : [0, 2b]→ R be defined as follows
Λ(x) := Π(ξ(x), x)− Π(ξ(2b− x), 2b− x), (26)
which is the difference of the supporting stationary bond prices of the two economies.
This must be zero at any steady state of the world economy. Proposition (3) implies
that Λ(0) > 0, Λ(2b) < 0, and that equalization of bond prices implies that Λ(b) = 0.
Therefore, for the existence of at least two asymmetric steady states it is enough to show
that Λ′(b) > 0.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 be satisfied. If µ∗ < 0 then Λ′(b) > 0 and
there exist at least two interior asymmetric steady states.
Figure 1 illustrates two cases with multiple interior asymmetric steady states. Panel (b)
reveals that the condition of the proposition is not necessary.
Given the symmetry of the dynamic system (20), it is known that there can be no complex
eigenvalues. However, the occurrence of interior asymmetric steady states is intimately
related to the instability of the symmetric steady state. This insight leads us to the main
11
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result, which consists of identifying values for the government parameters (b, p) which
cause symmetry breaking. Let Ω := R+ × (0, 1) denote the space of the government
parameters and let
Ωu = {(b, p) ∈ Ω|µ⋆ < 0}, Ωc = {(b, p) ∈ Ω|µ⋆ = 0}, and Ωs = {(b, p) ∈ Ω|µ⋆ > 0}
(27)
be a partition of Ω.
Proposition 5 Let the Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.
• The interior steady state (k∗, k∗) has two positive real roots.
• (k∗, k∗) is asymptotically stable only if (b, p) ∈ Ωs.
• (k∗, k∗) becomes unstable via a fold bifurcation, as (b, p) leaves the region Ωs.
Λ(x)
0
xb 2b
(a) Two Asymmetric SREE
Λ(x)
0
b 2b x
(b) Four Asymmetric SREE
Figure 1: Existence of Asymmetric Steady States
From Proposition 3 one knows that ǫ⋆k > 0 > ǫ
⋆
x. The first term in equation (24) cor-
responds essentially to the positive effect on real capital accumulation in each country
inducing the stabilizing force of domestic capital formation, which corresponds to the
stabilizing effect under autarky. The second effect, however, is an induced crowding out
effect on capital formation of additional bond holding. As (24) shows, its size depends
on the relative magnitudes of several parameters of the model induced by the production
function and by the risk aversion of consumers. If the second effect dominates the first
effect in size, the critical level reverses its sign and instability occurs. The proof of the
proposition (see appendix) reveals that the condition on the critical level of µ for local
instability is the same as the one in the proposition for multiple asymmetric steady states.
12
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Thus, instability implies the occurrence of multiple interior steady states. Therefore, sta-
ble asymmetric steady states exist, whenever symmetry breaking occurs. However, there
may exist multiple interior asymmetric steady states even when the symmetric state is
stable (see Figure 1(b)).
A Numerical Example:
In order to demonstrate the possibility of endogenously determined inequality and the
instability of the symmetric steady state we analyze a parameterized version of a world
economy of the above type. Suppose that the production function is Cobb-Douglas f(k) =
Akα, and that the utility function is of the exponential family such that its derivative has
the form
u′(c) = exp
(
−a
c1−γ
1− γ
)
a > 0, γ ≥ 0.
The absolute risk aversion isR(c) = ac−γ with elasticity−γ. It is clear that the production
function satisfies Assumptions 1 and 3 when α < 0.5. The utility function satisfies
Assumption 2 when a > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. The absolute risk aversion is constant with
R(c) = a when γ = 0, while it becomes R(c) = ac−1 when γ = 1. Thus, the above
specification includes the two utility functions CARA and CRRA as special cases.
In order to determine parameter regions under which the unique symmetric steady state
is unstable, we first determine a list of parameters (given in Table 1) for which instability
A α τ b p δ a γ
1.00 0.40 0.30 4.00 0.95 0.15 1.40 0.09
Table 1: Standard parameter set
occurs. Then, we perform pairwise deviations from this reference set and determine
numerically the range for which the instability is preserved. Clearly, continuity of the
2
1.75
1.5
1.25
1
0 1.5 3 4.5 6
b
a
(a) b - a parameter region
0.25
0.1875
0.125
0.0625
0
0 1.5 3 4.5 6
b
γ
(b) b - γ parameter region
0.25
0.1875
0.125
0.0625
0
0.9 0.925 0.95 0.975 1
p
γ
(c) p - γ parameter region
Figure 2: Parameter Regions with Unstable Symmetric Steady State
steady state (k∗, k∗) with all parameters of the system implies that the instability is
preserved on open set. In other words drawing (a, b, p, δ, γ) ∈ R5+ locally will display a
section of Ωu for which (k∗, k∗) is unstable. Figure 2 displays sections of the parameter
13
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region Ωu of instability in red/dark. Thus, in these regions there exist stable interior
asymmetric steady states. Conversely, the world economy has an interior symmetric
steady state only when the parameter values belong to the white region. Therefore, there
exists an open set of the parameters (a, b, p, δ, γ) ∈ R5+ for which symmetry breaking
occurs.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The paper provides a theoretical explanation of the occurrence of inter-country income
inequality and of the co-existence of rich and poor countries in the long run. A fully
neoclassical growth model with two identical economies is considered where consumers
hold portfolios of real capital and risky government discount bonds. Consumers have
rational expectations and all markets operate under perfect competition. One of the basic
features in such economies is given by the fact that government bonds have a crowding
out effect on real capital, in spite of the fact that consumers regard the acquisition of
a discount bond as a form of personal savings and investment. This is because, in the
portfolio decision of consumers, the income spent on the bond market reduces investment
in physical capital which results in the trading of bonds for consumption purposes. Thus,
government bonds crowd out real investment.
In a world economy with two identical countries their capital accumulation converges to a
unique and globally symmetric steady state when each bond market operates only domes-
tically. This symmetric world equilibrium remains as a steady state when the two bond
markets are joined. However, if the bond markets open internationally, the equalization
of the bond price may generate instability in each country’s capital accumulation near
the symmetric steady state. This is caused by an interaction of the elasticities of substi-
tution in production and of bond demand which appears only for each economy when it
becomes an open economy and its consumers are able to diversify their risks between the
internationally available bonds of two governments. Therefore, when two such economies
internationalize their bond markets prior to convergence under autarky, the dynamics in
the world economy does not lead to the symmetric steady state even for slightly asym-
metric initial capital endowments. In such cases the distribution of capital at the time of
internationalization becomes the major determinant of the differential features of steady
states in a world with otherwise identical economies. When the uncertainty of the gov-
ernment default is removed and the bonds become perfect substitutes for capital in the
portfolio decision of consumers, the instability no longer occurs. Thus, the existence of
sovereign risk and the internationalization of the associated bond markets are the cause
for symmetry breaking among identical or similar nations.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 1 If Assumption 2 is satisfied then R(y + x)− δR(y + δx) > 0, for any x, y > 0
and δ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof: Let us fix values x, y > 0 and define the function R : [0, 1] → R as follows
δ 7→ R(δ) ≡ R(y + x)− δR(y + δx). From this it follows that
R′(δ) = −R(y + δx)− δxR′(y + δx) = −R(y + δx)
[
1−
δx
y + δx
ǫR(c)
]
≤ 0, (28)
because, x, y > 0, the function R is non-negative and ǫR ∈ [0, 1]. Since R(0) = R(y+x) >
0 and R(1) = 0 the claim of the lemma follows.

Lemma 2 If α(k) < 0.5, then the function k 7→ φ(k) defined in (11) satisfies: φ(0) =∞,
φ(k) = 0, and φ is a strictly decreasing and non-negative.
Proof: By definition φ(k) = (1− τ)w(k)r(k)− kr(k). When 1−σ(k) ≤ α(k) < 0.5, then
the function φ is decreasing because, a)when α(k) < 0.5 then [w(k)r(k)]′ = w′(k)r(k) +
w(k)r′(k) = r′(k) (w(k)− kr(k)) < 0 and b) when 1 − σ(k) ≤ α(k) then capital income
kr(k) is an increasing function of capital. φ(K) = 0 by definition of K. In addition
limk→0 φ(k) = (1−τ) limk→0w(k)r(k) = (1−τ) limk→0 k
2α(k)−1 =∞. For (1−τ)w(k) > k
for k ∈ [0, K] and thus φ is non negative.

Proof of Proposition 1:
Let us define a function ψ : R2+ → R as follows
(k, x) 7→ ψ(k, x) =
1− p
p
u′(ρ(k) + δx)
u′(ρ(k) + x)
. (29)
Then
h(k, x) =
1 + δψ(k, x)
1 + ψ(k, x)
. (30)
By taking a natural log of both sides of equation (30) and then differentiating it we obtain
khk(k, x)
h(k, x)
=
(1− δ)kψ(k, x)
(1 + δψ(k, x))(1 + ψ(k, x))
[R(ρ(k) + δx)−R(ρ(k) + x)] ρ′(k) (31)
and
xhx(k, x)
h(k, x)
=
(1− δ)xψ(k, x)
(1 + δψ(k, x))(1 + ψ(k, x))
[δR(ρ(k) + δx)−R(ρ(k) + x)] . (32)
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When Assumption 1 is satisfied then the function ρ(k) = kr(k) is increasing. When
Assumption 2 is satisfied then agent’s absolute risk aversion function is decreasing and
thus the following inequality holds
kHk(k, x)
H(k, x)
=
khk(k, x)
h(k, x)
−
kr′(k)
r(k)
> 0. (33)
As a result, the function (k, x) 7→ H(k, x) is increasing with respect to its first argument.
When Assumption 2 is satisfied then the Lemma 1 implies that R(ρ(k) + x)− δR(ρ(k) +
δx) > 0 for any δ ∈ [0, 1). This with equation (32) implies that
xHx(k, x)
H(k, x)
=
xhx(k, x)
h(k, x)
< 0. (34)
As a result, the function (k, x) 7→ H(k, x) is decreasing with respect to its second argu-
ment.

Proof of Propositions 4 and 5:
µ⋆ = ǫ⋆k + ǫ
⋆
x
(
1 +
1
s⋆
(
α⋆
σ⋆
− 1
))
< 0 ⇔
α⋆
σ⋆
> 1− s⋆ − s⋆
ǫ⋆k
ǫ⋆x
. (35)
(35) can be rewritten
k⋆w′(k⋆)
w(k⋆)
>
k⋆
(1− τ)w(k⋆)
−
bq⋆
(1− τ)w(k⋆)
k⋆Π⋆k
bΠ⋆x
. (36)
(36) implies that
(1− τ)w′(k⋆)− 1 > −
Π⋆k
Π⋆x
Π⋆ ⇔ ((1− τ)w′(k⋆)− 1)Π⋆x +Π
⋆
kΠ
⋆ < 0. (37)
Since (1− τ)w′(k⋆)− 1− Π⋆kb < 0 it follows from (37) and from equations
Λ′(b) = Π⋆kξ
′(b) + Π⋆x and ξ
′(b) =
Π⋆xb+Π
⋆
(1− τ)w′(k⋆)− 1− Π⋆kb
(38)
that Λ′(b) > 0 if and only if (35) is satisfied.

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